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1 Summary 
This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I 
propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price 
all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned 
administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not 
address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.  
The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market 
with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in a 
fragmented bilateral market. There are no standard contracts and little price transparency. A 
coordinated auction for standard contracts will reduce transaction costs and improve price 
formation. An annual auction for firm gas contracts with one to five-year duration allows both 
sides of the market to manage risks.  
Efficient price formation is one of the most important objectives of the gas auction. The 
simultaneous ascending clock auction is ideally suited to promote efficient price formation. The 
ascending clock auction provides excellent price discovery and enables demanders to freely 
arbitrage across the products. This assures that any price difference among products is a 
reflection of value differences. 
My view is that the coordinated auction proposed here will significantly improve the market 
for firm gas contracts. 
2 Introduction 
As in most gas markets, the vast majority of Colombia’s gas is settled according to firm gas 
contracts with terms that are much longer than the daily spot market. Firm gas contracts often 
have durations of one to five years, and sometimes more. These firm gas contracts benefit both 
supply and demand. Both sides of the market are able to lock in a price, and thereby reduce price 
risk from the more volatile spot market. 
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Unfortunately, the existing firm gas contracting market has high transaction costs, as a result 
of non-standard contracts, poor price formation, localized contracting, lack of transparency, and 
other factors. 
CREG has proposed an auction for firm gas contracts to address these problems. The goal of 
the auction is to promote efficient price formation for firm gas contracts. Here I describe how the 
auction might work. The proposed auction should significantly lower transaction costs as a result 
of standard contracts and robust price formation in a transparent, national market. 
This paper presents a market design covering both the product design and auction design. 
Product design is the critical first step in the design of any market. It defines what is being 
traded. Good product design can play an important role in reducing complexity and increasing 
liquidity in the market. The second step is auction design—how the product is traded. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the purpose of the market. Then I consider 
elements of the Colombia gas market that are relevant to product and auction design. Next, I 
propose a simple product design. Then I turn to the auction design. I conclude with answers to 
common industry questions. 
Many important issues are beyond the scope of this preliminary study. Critical issues of 
guarantees and credit requirements will be addressed elsewhere. Also the related  transport 
market is only briefly discussed. 
3  Purpose of the market 
Many objectives must be considered in the design of the gas market. These can be grouped 
into seven interrelated categories: efficient price formation, transparency, neutrality, risk 
management, liquidity, simplicity, and consistency. 
•  Efficient price formation. The market should produce reliable price signals based on 
market fundamentals. It should enhance competition and mitigate market structure 
problems. It should produce market-based prices for customers, such that any price 
difference among products reflects value differences. 
•  Transparency. The market should be highly transparent. Bids should be comparable. It 
should be clear why one bid is accepted and another rejected. It should result in prompt 
regulatory review and approval, and encourage regulatory certainty. 
•  Neutrality. All suppliers should be treated equally, and all demanders should be treated 
equally. 
•  Risk management. It should reduce risks for both supply and demand by providing price 
stability, yet be responsive to long-run market fundamentals. The market should shield 
participants from short-term transient events, and address counterparty risk. 
•  Liquidity. The market should promote a secondary market, including a liquid market for 
the primary products, as well as derivative products of shorter term. 
•  Simplicity. The market should be simple for participants, for the auctioneer, and for the 
regulator. 
•  Consistency. The market should be consistent with the other key elements of the 
Colombia setting. The most important of these are the transport market and the electricity   3
market. It also should be consistent with, or improve upon, the best-practice in other gas 
markets. 
Fortunately, these objectives are largely complementary with one another. Hence, it is 
possible to design the market to satisfy all of these objectives. 
4  The Colombia setting 
Roughly 90% of Colombia’s gas supply comes from two main fields: Guajira on the coast 
and Cusiana in the interior. Several minor fields account for the remaining 10%. Guajira has 
about one-half of Colombia’s reserves and currently provides 65% of production. The field is 
operated by Ecopetrol and ChevronTexaco. Cusiana has about 50% of reserves and currently 
provides 25% of production. The field is operated by Ecopetrol, BP, and Total. 
Table 1. Gas supply by company in January 2008 
Company GBTUD Share HHI
Ecopetrol 518 62% 3800
Chevron 185 22% 483
BP 53 6% 40
Total 33 4% 15
Pacific Rubiales 27 3% 10
Others 25 3% 9
Total 841 100% 4357  
Gas supply in Colombia is highly concentrated. Table 1 shows production by company in 
January 2008. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, HHI, for gas supply is 4357.
3  
Table 2. Gas supply by company and field in January 2008 













Gas from the Guajira field is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The auction only 
applies to the unregulated gas coming from other fields. Hence, a more relevant measure of 
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concentration is that of the Cusiana field. Table 2 shows production by company and field. HHI 
for the Cusiana field is 4446—about the same as for all of the fields combined. 
Demand for gas falls into four categories: residential and commercial (19%), industrial 
(45%), electricity (24%), and vehicles (11%). Demand is located on the coast (34%) and the 
interior (52%). In addition, currently 14% of demand is an export to Venezuela. On the coast, 
about 49% of demand is to generate electricity. The interior also has significant gas-fired 
generation capacity, but these units generate little electricity in a typical year, since hydro 
resources are less expensive whenever there is sufficient water 
Table 3. Firm gas contracted in January 2008 
Company Type of Company GBTUD Share HHI
e2 Energia Eficiente Marketer 121.96 13% 166
Gas Natural Local distribution company 105.20 11% 124
Gecelca Thermal generator 100.00 11% 112
Refinería Barrancabermeja Refinery 90.00 10% 90
Empresas Publicas de Medellin Thermal generator 69.60 7% 54
Isagen Thermal generator 59.00 6% 39
Termoflores Thermal generator 52.87 6% 31
Termoyopal Thermal generator 46.72 5% 24
Cementos Argos Industry 36.00 4% 14
Empresa de Energia del Pacifico Thermal generator 36.00 4% 14
Merilectrica SCA Thermal generator 32.80 3% 12
PDVSA Gas Export 32.80 3% 12
Abonos Colombianos Industry 20.50 2% 5
Cerromatoso Industry 16.00 2% 3
Termoemcali I SCA Thermal generator 16.00 2% 3
Refineria Cartagena Refinery 14.94 2% 2
Empresas Públicas de Medellín Local distribution company 12.30 1% 2
Termoflores (Flores III) Thermal generator 10.53 1% 1
Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas Local distribution company 9.62 1% 1
Ecopetrol Producer 9.14 1% 1
Dinagas Marketer 9.10 1% 1
Alcanos de Colombia Local distribution company 8.10 1% 1
Termoflores (Flores II) Thermal generator 7.37 1% 1
Perenco Colombia Producer 5.24 1% 0
Gases del Llano Local distribution company 4.50 0% 0
Mansarovar Colombia Energy Industry 4.50 0% 0
Drummond Limited Sucursal Colombia Industry 4.35 0% 0
Fertilizantes Colombianos-Ferticol Industry 2.50 0% 0
Petrobras Colombia Producer 2.40 0% 0
Cemex Colombia Industry 2.10 0% 0
Gas Natural de Cesar Local distribution company 0.88 0% 0
Gases del Cusiana Local distribution company 0.85 0% 0
Madigas Ingenieros Local distribution company 0.60 0% 0
Gases del Caribe Local distribution company 0.60 0% 0
Estación de Bombeo Monterrey Industry 0.55 0% 0
Termocoa Thermal generator 0.40 0% 0
Surtigas Local distribution company 0.18 0% 0
Enerca Local distribution company 0.16 0% 0
Proviservicios Local distribution company 0.09 0% 0
Total 946.45 100% 714 
The market for firm gas is unconcentrated on the buyer side. Table 3 shows firm gas 
contracted in January 2008. The total of all contracts exceeds production, because some quantity, 
especially from thermal generators was not taken. The HHI of 714 is an underestimate, since   5
some of the companies listed have the same owner, but nonetheless  firm gas remains 
unconcentrated on the buyer side. 
Transport of gas currently occurs at distance-based regulated prices intended to cover 
pipeline costs. This approach is satisfactory if the pipelines are unconstrained. However, 
pipelines often are constrained. Congestion-based pricing likely is needed to assure that pipeline 
demand is consistent with capacity. 
Current gas contracts are mostly take-or-pay with a high minimum percentage over the 
month or year (often 100%). Most contracts are for one or two years, although there are some 
that are much longer.  There is a large variety of contracts.  
Currently there is no LNG capability in Colombia. Also there is no storage.  
5  An auction proposal 
The first question to ask is whether the auction will be mandatory for producers or 
voluntary. Mandatory means that producers sell all their long-term contracts in the auction; 
whereas, voluntary would allow producers to also sell long-term gas contracts bilaterally. I think 
it is important that participation by producers be mandatory. Mandatory participation guarantees 
that all demand will participate in the auction. Mandatory participation also enhances 
transparency and improves the price signal.  
The second question is the scope of the auction. Separate auctions could be conducted for 
each producer and field. However, given that most of the auctioned volume would come from 
Cusiana, I think it would be desirable to conduct a single auction event including all auctioned 
fields and producers. This would allow buyers to see at one time all the options for long-term gas 
contracts. More importantly, the proposed format would allow bidders to arbitrage across the 
substitute products, enhancing price formation and reducing transaction costs. 
5.1 Product  definition 
The product is a take-or-pay contract for firm gas with a duration of one or more years. I 
recommend that the producers work with gas demanders and CREG to establish a standard 
contract for long-term gas. The contract would specify: 
•  The delivery point, for example Cusiana. 
•  The minimum percentage of take on a monthly or yearly basis, and the cap on the rate of 
take.  
•  The start date and duration. 
•  Whether and how the price is indexed. 
•  The lot size. 
•  The guarantees and penalties. 
The benefits of a standard contract are substantial. A standard contract simplifies the market 
by reducing the number of products. This reduces transaction costs, increases liquidity, and 
enhances the secondary market. Transparency and price formation are improved. Both buyers 
and producers will benefit from the use of standard contracts.    6
Establishing guarantees and penalties is beyond the scope of this study. They are, however, 
crucial to the success of the market. They also are interrelated with the product design. For 
example, contracts of longer duration require larger guarantees. Thus, the choice of a longer-term 
contract needs to reflect the tradeoff between reduced price risk and the cost of a larger 
guarantee. 
Guarantees should be kept as small as possible and still satisfy a high level of security from 
counterparty risk. 
To limit inflation risk, I recommend that for multi-year contracts that the price be indexed 
for inflation, using the Colombian Producers’ Price Index (IPP) or another suitable index. 
I recommend a small lot size, say 10 MBTU/d. This gives buyers great flexibility in 
expressing quantity. 
I recommend durations from 1-year to 5-year. Some buyers may prefer even longer 
durations. However, I doubt that suppliers would be willing to offer firm gas at attractive prices 
with such long durations given the uncertainties of supply. 
An annual auction event is appropriate for the auctioning of long-term firm gas contracts. It 
would be possible to conduct auctions more frequently, such as twice-a-year or quarterly, but I 
think that the needs of market participants can best be met with a single annual auction.  
5.2 Supply 
Before the auction, each producer announces its supply schedule—the quantity offered for 
each product. The supplier specifies a reserve price below which it will not sell any quantity. The 
supplier may offer additional quantity at higher prices. Figure 1 gives an example of two supply 
schedules. In the first, the producer offers 100 lots with a reserve price of $4: at all prices at or 
above $4 the producer sells 100 lots. In the second example, again the producer offers 100 lots 
with a reserve price of $4, but this time the producer offers an additional 30 lots if the price is $7 
or more. The supplier’s reserve price should equal its opportunity cost, typically calculated as the 
opportunity to sell the gas at a future time. 
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The supply schedules for each producer are combined to form the aggregate supply 
schedule, which gives the total quantity offered for each product as a function of price. It is the 
announcement of the supply schedules that motivates the buyers to participate in the auction. 
With this information, the buyers can prepare for the auction—assessing needs, developing 
strategy, and securing guarantees. 
The auction works best if the products offered are close substitutes. Figure 2 shows a sample 
supply of products for the 2009 auction for delivery at Cusiana. There are three suppliers, Pink, 
Blue, and Orange, each offering quantity for up to five products. The products differ only in 
duration. All products start in 2010 with durations from 1-year to 5-year. The quantities are the 
maximum quantities, assuming all reserve prices are met. For the 1-year product, Pink is offering 
300, Blue 200, and Orange 100. Any buyer of a product would win quantity from all producers 
in proportion to the quantity offered by each supplier. Thus, a buyer winning 6 lots of product 1 
would get 3 lots from Pink, 2 lots from Blue, and 1 lot from Orange. 
Figure 2. Sample supply of products 
Suppliers
lot = 100 MBTU/d Pink
Blue






















Each producer decides before the auction how it wishes to split its quantity among durations 
and establish its reserve prices. There is no requirement that quantity be offered for all products 
or in any particular proportion. And there is no requirement that different producers have the 
same reserve price. Nonetheless, each producer has an incentive to offer products that the buyers 
will find attractive. Thus, if buyers are willing to pay a premium for longer durations, producers 
should be willing to offer more quantity with longer durations.    8
Importantly, with the recommended structure of products, as shown in Figure 2, all the 
products are close substitutes from a buyer’s point of view. The reason is that all the products 
satisfy the buyer’s most immediate need of providing firm gas in the year 2010. A simultaneous 
auction in which all the products are strong substitutes can be expected to have excellent price 
formation.  
In contrast, Figure 3 shows an alternative arrangement in which the products are defined as 
firm gas in a particular year. I do not recommend this structure. The reason is that with this 
structure the products are complements for the buyer, not substitutes. 2011 firm gas is not a 
substitute for 2010 firm gas. Auctions for complements generally have more challenging price 
formation, than auctions for substitutes. 
Figure 3. Alternative with supply by year 
Product 3 Product 4 Product 5
2012 2013 2014
Suppliers
2009 auction for delivery at Cusiana
Commitment Period
2010 2011
Product 1 Product 2  
New quantity will become available each year, as prior contracts expire, as production 
capacity expands, and as producer uncertainty about future production is resolved. 
5.3  Auction design: simultaneous ascending clock auction 
The proposed auction design is a simultaneous ascending clock auction, similar to the firm 
energy market (see Cramton and Stoft 2007) and the organized market for forward energy (see 
Cramton 2007). There are two important differences. First, prices ascend, rather than descend, 
since buyers are competing to purchase gas contracts. In the other auctions suppliers are 
competing to sell. Second, there are more products, reflecting multiple delivery points and 
multiple durations. Multiple substitutable products are readily handled within the ascending 
clock auction. As in the forward energy auction, bids at the clearing price may be rationed in this 
auction in order to balance supply and demand. This simplifies auction clearing. 
The motivation for using a dynamic auction, rather than a sealed bid auction, is explained in 
detail in Cramton (1998) and Ausubel and Cramton (2004). In brief, the approach allows price 
discovery: bidders can learn from the bidding process and condition their bids on this 
information. This is especially useful when there are many products, as is the case here. Then the   9
bidders can freely arbitrage across the products. This arbitrage improves auction efficiency. 
Competitive market prices are determined for each product. In particular, the price separation 
between any two products reflects the difference in the value of demand. 
The ascending clock auction is an especially simple and powerful dynamic auction. In each 
round, the auctioneer announces a price for each product. Each bidder then indicates its desired 
quantity for each of the products at the current prices. In subsequent rounds, the price increases 
for each product with excess demand. The bidders then again express the quantity of each 
product desired at the new prices. This process is repeated until there is no excess demand of any 
product. 










Figure 4 illustrates an ascending clock auction for a single product. The price starts at the 
reserve price where there is substantial excess demand. As the price rises the aggregate demand 
curve is revealed. As prices rise, demand falls. The process continues until demand equals 
supply. Each bidder wins its quantity at the clearing price and pays the clearing price for all lots 
won. This is a dynamic version of a uniform-price auction. 
In practice it is desirable to have discrete rounds. Figure 5 shows how this works, again for a 
single product. Whenever a bidder reduces its quantity, the bidder states the exact price of the 
reduction. Thus, the aggregate demand curve typically has a number of small steps between the 
prior round price and the current round price, where each step is a particular reduction in 
quantity by one of the bidders.   10



































For the ascending clock auction to work as intended, it is important for the starting prices to 
be set sufficiently low that it creates significant excess demand. Setting starting prices too low 
causes little harm. It is competition among the bidders that determines the clearing prices. The 
low starting prices will quickly be bid up, unless there is insufficient competition, which is 
unlikely in this context. In contrast, setting starting prices too high can damage the auction. I 
recommend that the starting price for each product be set at the lowest reserve price among the 
producers. 
An activity rule in a dynamic auction is intended to enhance price discovery by motivating 
each bidder to bid throughout the auction in a manner that is consistent with the bidder’s true 
preferences. To the extent that bids better reflect each bidder’s true preferences, prices are more 
apt to progress in a manner consistent with final competitive prices. This allows bidders to focus 
their decision-making attention on more realistic packages of items, improving bidder decision 
making. 
The need for an activity rule in a dynamic auction is seen in the tendency of sophisticated 
bidders in eBay auctions to bid snipe. Bid sniping is waiting until the last minute before 
submitting a bid. There are numerous reasons for this common behavior, but one of the most 
frequent is a desire to prevent other bidders from responding to your bid. If all bidders bid snipe, 
then the dynamic auction becomes a sealed-bid auction and all the benefits of price discovery are 
lost. 
Fortunately, there is a simple and general activity rule for this setting. 
Activity rule: A bidder can only maintain or reduce aggregate quantity as prices rise. That 
is, the bidder must bid a (weakly) downward sloping aggregate demand curve throughout the 
auction. 
Note that this activity rule imposes no restriction on the ability of the bidder to arbitrage 
across the products—the restriction is with respect to the aggregate quantity demanded, not the   11
quantity for any individual product. Since the products are close substitutes this flexibility is 
appropriate. 
Figure 6 illustrates how the auction works with many products. The top row indicates the 
supply offered for each of the five products. For simplicity, I have assumed that each product has 
the same starting price of $5. At this low price, all but one of the products has excess demand; 
only the 3-year product does not. As a result, for round 2, the price increases for all products, 
except the 3-year product. Notice that the 1-year and 5-year products increase slightly faster, 
since these products had greater excess demand. In round 2, overall demand is the same as in 
round 1 at 3900 lots. No bidder has reduced demands. However, bidders did switch some 
quantity from one product to others. As a result, at the end of round 2 there is excess demand for 
all products, and so all products have higher prices in round 3. By round 9, we have supply and 
demand balance for four of the five products; only the 3-year product has excess demand. Thus, 
in round 10, only the 3-year product has a higher price. All products clear, and the auction ends, 
when the 3-year price reaches $7.85 and there is a reduction of 50, causing demand to match 
supply. 
Figure 6. An auction with many products 
1-year 2-year 3-year 4-year 5-year Total
Round Supply 600 500 400 400 400 2300
Price $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00 $5.00
Demand 1200 800 300 700 900 3900
Price $5.50 $5.40 $5.00 $5.40 $5.60
Demand 1000 900 600 600 800 3900
Price $5.90 $5.90 $5.50 $5.80 $6.00
Demand 900 900 600 550 750 3700
…
Price $7.60 $7.80 $7.70 $7.90 $7.90
Demand 600 500 450 400 400 2350
Price $7.60 $7.80 $7.85 $7.90 $7.90
Demand 600 500 400 400 400 2300
10
2009 auction for delivery at Cusiana








In general, as a result of switching or reductions, it would be possible for a product to go 
from excess demand to excess supply. This, however, is prevented in the auction rules. First, 
reductions are only accepted to the point where demand equals supply. Thus in round 10, if a 
bidder made a reduction of 75 at the price of $7.85, then in fact only the first 50 of the reduction 
is accepted (the amount of excess demand). The price is stopped at $7.85, the price of the 
reduction. Second, switches are similarly restricted to prevent excess supply. With these 
restrictions, once a product has excess demand, it is guaranteed that the product’s full quantity 
will be sold. 
Notice that the total quantity across all products declines monotonically throughout the 
auction. This is implied by the activity rule. 
The simultaneous ascending clock auction has many important advantages. Chief among 
these advantages are price and assignment discover. Buyers can build a desired portfolio of 
products given prices that best fits their needs.   12
An important requirement of any dynamic auction is that the auction can be “price only,” in 
the sense that all contract matters are resolved except for price. Thus, the auction will identify 
who the winners are and what prices will be paid. This requires that each buyer perceives that 
there are no substantial differences among sellers, and similarly that each seller perceives that 
there are no substantial differences among buyers. The most common source of difference is 
counterparty risk. Thus, it is important that the policy for guarantees and penalties is such that 
differences in counterparty risk are minimized. 
The information policy determines who knows what in the auction. As mentioned, each 
producer announces its supply schedule for each product before the auction. Starting prices are 
also reported. At the end of every round, the auctioneer reports at a minimum: 1) the excess 
demand for each product, 2) the prices for the next round. Additional information such as the 
quantities bid by each bidder may also be reported. This information may be helpful for some in 
assessing likely transport bottlenecks.  
5.4 International  experience 
The approach proposed here for long-term gas contracts is consistent with international best-
practice. In the last five years, there have been many long-term gas auctions using an ascending 
clock format. These auctions were either single events or annual auctions as indicated below: 
•  German gas release program (E.ON Ruhrgas); series of six annual auctions (2003 – 2008) 
•  Hungary gas release program (E.ON Ruhrgas); series of five annual auctions (2006 – 2010) 
•  Danish Oil and Natural Gas gas release programme; series of six annual auctions (2006 – 
2011) 
•  Gaz de France gas storage auction; single auction (Feb 2006) 
•  Gaz de France gas release programme; single auction (Oct 2004) 
•  Total gas release program; single auction (Oct 2004) 
These auctions occurred in four separate countries. All were conducted with regulatory 
oversight. 
Since 2001, similar auctions have been conducted for various long-term electricity products. 
These auctions have occurred in the U.S., several European countries, Colombia, and Brazil. 
It is my view that the design presented here is consistent with the best practices elsewhere. 
5.5 Variations 
Variations in the auction format are certainly possible. One variation adopted by Ecopetrol 
for one of its auctions used standard e-sourcing software from SAP to conduct an auction for a 
single product. The approach is similar to the ascending clock auction, except that there are 
tentative winners throughout the auction (those with the highest current bids up to the supply 
available). Tentative losers may displace the current winners by bidding quantity at a higher 
price. The auction continues until there is a period of ten minutes (or some other time window) in 
which no bid is placed. An advantage of this approach is its simplicity and the ability to use 
standard e-sourcing software to conduct the auction. A disadvantage of the approach is that it 
appears limited to auctioning a single product at a time. In addition, the price discovery is   13
inferior, because of the absence of a meaningful activity rule. Bidders can bid snipe. Extending 
the approach to multiple products may be possible. However, the absence of a meaningful 
activity rule will undermine price discovery, which is especially important when auctioning 
many related products. 
5.6 Organization 
I recommend that the producers jointly implement a single annual auction event. This will 
yield the best price formation. The auction can be conducted by an independent auctioneer 
retained by the producers. The auction should be developed and conducted with regulatory 
oversight.  
5.7  What if a seller is also a buyer? 
It is straightforward to handle the situation where a seller is also a buyer, for example, as in 
the case of Ecopetrol buying gas for use in its refinery operations. The simplest approach is for 
the seller to announce its supply schedule, just like any other seller, and in addition announce its 
demand schedule. Both announcements are made before the auction starts. The seller is a price 
taker for the quantity it wins, paying the clearing price. This is equivalent to the seller removing 
the quantity it buys from its supply schedule.  
5.8  Priority for internal demand 
The resolution includes a priority for internal demand. This can be implemented at the 
conclusion of each annual auction as follows. If at the clearing price an export wins quantity, 
then losing internal demand has the right of first refusal to displace the export. The right of first 
refusal is granted in order of quantity reductions with the last to reduce given the first 
opportunity to exercise the right of first refusal.  
An important benefit of this approach is that the clearing prices do not change. The only 
change is the possibility that some export quantity may be displaced by internal demand. This 
means that no subsidy or revenue source is required to give priority to internal demand. 
If the demand side is highly competitive then it is unlikely that the right of first refusal will 
displace any exports, since the losing internal demand has already rejected the price paid by 
exports as too high. However, the right of first refusal does give internal demand some advantage 
in other instances. 
5.9  Addressing market power 
Two features of the proposal are intended to address market power concerns. First, the seller 
must commit to its supply schedule before the auction starts. This prevents the seller from 
adjusting its offer in response to revealed buyer demands during the auction. Second and perhaps 
more importantly, the auction is an open and transparent process with regulatory oversight. The 
auction will be monitored for any apparent exercise of market power. In the event of market 
power abuse, additional steps can be taken, such as placing a cap on the reserve prices of 
producers.    14
5.10 Secondary market 
There are two types of secondary markets: one for long-term gas contracts and one for spot 
transactions.  
The spot market for gas typically is a day-ahead market in which both producers and 
demanders can balance their positions based on the latest information. Producers can participate 
in the spot market.  
In contrast, the bilateral trade of long-term gas products should be limited to demanders, not 
producers. This restriction on producers is needed in order to make the auction mandatory for 
producers. Otherwise, producers could sell some or all of their long-term gas in bilateral markets, 
bypassing the auction.  
One further way to enhance transparency in the market is to establish a registry of contracts. 
All the auctioned contracts would be included in this registry, but additionally the registry would 
reflect any change as a result of bilateral trade. One advantage of a registry of contracts is that it 
could help market participants better understand supply and demand by location, and hence the 
likely bottlenecks in the pipeline network. 
6 Transport 
As mentioned earlier, the proposed auction does not address transport. A buyer requires firm 
gas and transport from the supply delivery point to the buyer’s demand location. In the event that 
the pipeline network is unconstrained then the required capacity on the network is readily 
purchased at the regulated price. However, it is likely that some pipeline elements will be 
constrained at least in the shortrun until enhancements to the network can be made.  
In the event of congestion, ideally both firm gas and transport can be purchased at the same 
time, where the transport price reflects the congestion price. This, however, would lead to a 
complex auction, one that I view is too complex to develop in the near term.  
Absent a simultaneous auction of both firm gas and transport, a buyer has two options: 
buying firm gas and then securing pipeline capacity after the auction, or buying transport 
capacity first and then participating in the auction for firm gas. Both of these options involve a 
chicken-and-egg problem for the buyer. Neither is ideal, but both are workable in the near term. 
Nonetheless, it will be important to better address the transport issue in subsequent work. 
7 Industry  questions 
[To be written after industry has had an opportunity to comment on the proposal.] 
8 Conclusion 
The proposed auction of firm gas promises to reduce transaction costs and improve 
efficiency in the market for long-term gas contracts. 
Efficient price formation is one of the most important objectives of the firm gas auction. The 
simultaneous ascending clock auction is ideally suited to promote efficient price formation. The 
ascending clock auction provides excellent price discovery and enables buyers to freely arbitrage 
across the products. This assures that any price differences among products reflect value 
differences.   15
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